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Abstract 
 
Although they make up a considerable share of the electorate, the literature has 
overlooked the voting behaviour of non-ideological voters. Using Spanish electoral data from 
the 1979-2004 electoral period, we seek to identify which alternative cues these voters may 
use when they cast their ballot – providing ideology is not available. We do not find that 
evaluations of the incumbent’s performance have a higher influence on non-ideological 
voters as the retrospective voting literature suggests. Nor we find that other shortcuts such as 
candidate evaluations or party identification are more used by this group when they vote. 
Instead, our results indicate that non-ideological voters have exchanged the traditional 
ideological shortcut for the simple pro-incumbent voting as a decision rule.  
 
KEY WORDS: ideology, performance, leadership, party identification, incumbency 
bias, unlocated voters, Spain. 
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1. Introduction
∗ 
 
It is well-known that voters do not cast their ballot randomly. The existence of 
ideological voters among the electorate permits to know to some extent the vote share that 
each political party will obtain, since ideology works as a psychological tie that restricts 
voter’s actual sort of options. This fact make politicians’ job easier and safer: a certain 
amount of votes are less volatile and less dependent on political or economic circumstances 
during their term in office. However, some voters decide not to “invest” in this voting 
shortcut with the result of reporting no ideology. In being so, the puzzling question is: how do 
they make up their minds in order to pick up a party ballot? Do they use alternative shortcuts? 
This is the main research question that this paper will address. 
 
The study of the electoral behaviour of voters without ideology has important 
implications for the literature on electoral studies. Traditionally, in this field, non-ideological 
voters1 have been pulled out of statistical models. Regardless of their numerical size, voters 
without placement within the 10-point-range ideological scale have been thrown into the 
dustbin of missing voters (cases), that is, voters without a say in the explanation of the 
electoral outcomes. This rationale usually takes on implicit rather than explicit assumptions –
namely, that non-ideological voters behave in a similar fashion than ideological voters. In 
other words, the way in which non-ideological voters distribute their votes among party 
options fits nicely the way in which ideological voters do it. As a consequence, the absence of 
these non-ideological voters does not make a difference on the empirical analyses. Rather 
than taking it for granted, this paper will aim at testing empirically this implicit assumption 
on the voting randomness of non-located voters. We will try to find out whether it is plausible 
to drop such a considerable amount of voters from the empirical models of electoral 
behaviour without having any effect on the outcomes. 
                                               
∗ We would like to thank José R. Montero, Pepe Real, Nacho Lago, Laia Balcells, Priscila Ferreira, Pepe 
Fernández-Albertos and participants at the Graduate Workshop in Political Science at Nuffield College, where a 
previous draft of this paper was presented. All errors remaining are ours. 
 
1 In this paper, we will use “non-ideological”, “unlocated” and “non-located” indistinctively for the 
absence of individual self-placement in the ideological dimension. 
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In sum, in this paper we are interested in analysing the electoral behaviour of non-
ideological voters. We will look at their size as well as their rates of turnout in order to 
quantify their strategic importance in the electoral contest. In addition to describing their 
main characteristics, we will find out whether non-located voters follow specific patterns of 
voting. 
 
The paper is divided in seven sections. First, we will show that voters reporting no 
ideology compound a minor but still significant portion of the electorate in most democratic 
countries. Second, we will observe in section 3 the electoral patterns of these voters in 
Spanish elections since 1979 and we will introduce the hypotheses that may explain them. 
These hypotheses will be developed and tested in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 will discuss the 
potential results and offer alternative explanations. Finally, some concluding remarks will 
close the paper. 
 
 
 
2. Unlocated Voters in Comparative Perspective 
 
Literature on electoral behaviour almost completely agrees that when people engage in 
politics they do it with very low levels of information (Converse 2000). This is so because 
becoming informed about politics always bears costs: “the cost of political information is 
never zero”, as Downs put it (1957 p. 240). However, it is also true that these costs do not 
detract people from taking political decisions (i.e. the voting levels are quite high across the 
world relative to the costs in which every voter is supposed to incur when casting her ballot). 
Given this fact, scholars dealing with electoral behaviour have tried to trace out the main 
foundations that people use to act in politics. 
 
In this sense, ideology has been considered as one of the main shortcuts the electorate 
has to save information costs in politics (Ferejohn 1990, Popkin 1991, Sniderman et al 1991, 
Hinich & Munger 1994, Luppia & McCubbins 1998, MacKuen etl al 2003, Kuklinski & 
Quirck 2000). For instance, Popkin (1991) points out that voters follow a “low information 
rationality” when they decide their vote and ideology becomes the predominant shortcut 
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available to reduce the information costs in politics. But Popkin also sees ideology as a 
fruitful device for political parties when they organise the political contest, because it allows 
political parties to illustrate more clearly their differences from competitors in the eyes of the 
electorate. 
 
Even though ideology is a strong predictor of how both parties and voters behave in 
politics, there are a considerable number of voters that do not place themselves in the 
ideological continuum. In this paper we consider “non-located” voters those who reject to 
locate themselves within the left-right ideological scale, that is, those who pick up a “don’t 
know/no answer” (dk/na) response. 
 
The validity of the option “na/dk” in surveys has been largely debated in public opinion 
literature. Converse (1964) has pointed out that some interviewed report answers without 
having underlying attitudes. The opposite may also be true: some dk/na responses may not be 
real non-attitudes. False negatives –as Gilham and Gramberg (1994) call them- are those who 
apparently show no attitude, but they turn out to take a position if the topic is asked 
differently. Certainly, dk/na option may shelter different meanings –ignorance, indecision or 
uncertainty about the meaning of the question asked (Sanchez y Morchio 1992). 
 
Obviously, in our study we cannot be fully sure if dk/na respondents are really non-
ideological voters (or if those who place themselves in the left/right scale are truly ideological 
voters). But there is some evidence that unlocated voters are truly reporting a non-attitude. In 
a Spanish CIS survey of 1982, apart from the traditional left-right scale question, it also 
appears an alternative item asking for the affiliation to the main ideologies (marxist, 
anarquist, centrist, between others). Most dk/na in left/right scale specifically report to have 
no ideology (53%) in the alternative scale and only a ten percent is able to place themselves 
in one of the ideological categories. The rest remain in the dk/na option.  Hence, we find high 
consistency in both questions, with a 90% systematically reporting a non-attitude, which 
seems to qualify our dk/na respondents as “true negatives”. 
 
Research on electoral studies tends not to consider these voters as significant or 
influential, and consequently, they are dropped from their models. But table 1 clearly points 
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out that for most democratic countries2 those not having an individual location within the 
ideological dimension exceed the 15 percent of all voters. The percentage ranges from the 
insignificant 2 percent of Norway to the almost 60 percent of Bulgaria. On average, unlocated 
voters represent one fifth of the electorate. Therefore, this kind of voters composes a small 
nonetheless significant portion of the electorate of most democracies. 
 
A clear pattern that we find in table 1 is that the electoral participation of unlocated 
voters is lower in all countries except Korea and Taiwan. Despite the remarkable 14-percent 
gap between located and unlocated participation, almost three quarters of the latter group 
decide to turnout.3 In brief, voters with no ideology still represent an important volume of 
those who finally decide to attend the polls on election’s day. Their potential influence on the 
electoral results has not to be overlooked as they represent almost the 18 percent of all 
participants. 
 
Another remarkable finding is that new democracies show higher levels of unlocated 
voters. Indeed, there is a negative correlation of 0.37 (significant at 0.05 level) between years 
of democracy4 and the level of unlocated voters. This may be explained by the fact that new 
democracies abide likely more unstable party systems –because of the oversupply of parties- 
and more ideologically volatile party positions –because of the process of matching between 
electorate and parties (Tavits 2005). On the contrary, affluent democracies have smaller 
levels of non-ideological voters. Around 10% of voters in the European countries do not hold 
an ideological position within the 10-point-range scale. Leaving the Canadian case aside, 
there is no a consolidated democratic polity with more than 20% of unlocated voters.  
 
                                               
2 Data used in table 1 comes from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which collects 
post-election surveys of 39 countries (CSES Secretariat 2004). See the data appendix to follow how the relevant 
variables were generated. 
3 It is important to point out that voter turnout is always overestimated in electoral surveys (Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980, Sigelman 1982). In fact, the current evidence states that “non-voting voters” tend to be 
less interested in politics, which it is a characteristic present within the Spanish unlocated voters, as we will see 
in section 3. Hence, it is reasonable to think that the participation gap between ideological and non-ideological 
voters will be higher than reported in table 1. 
4 Data on “years of democracy” has been taken from the Polity IV Project dataset (reachable at 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity). We use the 1998 values of this variable in its logarithm form. 
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Table 1. Unlocated voters in comparative perspective (CSES dataset) 
Country Observations % Unlocated  Turnout IV1 Turnout UV2 
Norway 97 2033 2.19 86.59 55.56 
Czech Rep. 96 990 3.09 90.13 67.57 
Denmark 98 1973 3.45 96.72 77.59 
Germany 98 1900 8.02 93.39 77.5 
Switzerland 99 2011 8.15 64.23 22.29 
United States 96 1533 8.21 77.4 64.52 
Peru 01 1113 8.94 96.07 88 
Island 99 1569 8.95 92.93 69.9 
Chile 99 1112 9.21 92.16 74.74 
Belgium (Walloon) 99 1960 10.31 93.02 87.07 
Poland 97 1981 10.53 59.86 26.56 
Belgium (Flanders) 99 2179 12.02 99.07 98.64 
Israel 96 1087 13.47 92.97 84.87 
Australia96 1798 13.90 99.07 98.27 
Spain 96 1198 14.44 90.71 78.63 
Portugal 02 1206 14.66 75.76 38.57 
Spain 00 1189 14.74 83.97 57.78 
Sweden 98 1154 15.64 90.43 76.51 
United Kingdom97 2753 17.47 85.51 71.26 
South Korea 00 1100 18.27 85.97 88.03 
Netherlands 98 2082 19.56 92.13 70.83 
Peru 00 1102 19.60 94.92 92.13 
New Zealand 96 3949 19.93 97.89 89.23 
Hong Kong 98 673 21.40 74.38 66.49 
Hungary 98 1504 22.30 77.2 49.83 
Mexico 97 1753 24.94 77.5 69.07 
Mexico 00 1992 28.43 96.36 90.67 
Canada 97 1814 31.93 88.53 77.05 
Lithuania 97 864 33.30 94.97 78.91 
Slovenia 96 2031 33.43 80.19 64.02 
Russia 99 1747 33.77 84.18 68.39 
Hong Kong 00 996 34.12 63.86 43.84 
Russia 00 1834 34.84 n.a. n.a. 
Rumania96 1171 36.68 94.4 85.21 
Ukraine 98 1137 38.59 79.15 68.18 
Taiwan 96 1198 52.17 91.35 92 
Bulgaria 2001 998 58.80 86.6 85.63 
Japan 96 1273 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Thailand 01 780 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1 Ideological Voters; 2 Unlocated Voters. 
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Yet, table 1 does not allow us to analyse the rates of unlocated voters in a longitudinal 
perspective. To solve it, from now on we will focus on our empirical case: democratic Spain. 
Figure 1 includes the time evolution of the share of unlocated voters and their turnout -as well 
as the ideological voters’ turnout- during the last 7 democratic elections held in Spain (from 
1982 to 2004).5 The figure arises several facts. First, the level of unlocated voters did go 
down along the 80s until remaining stable around 20% in the middle of the 90s. This 
evolution seems to confirm the previous intuition that citizens become more accustomed to 
parties and ideologies when the democratic system cements into the society. On the other 
hand, levels of 20% without an ideological stance could be catching country-level effects 
mediated in the Spanish case by the long duration of the Francoist regime.6 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of unlocated voters in Spain: 1982-2004 
 
 
 
A second finding is that turnout levels manifest a 15-percent-point gap between 
ideological and non-ideological voters. The former exhibits systematic higher levels of 
turnout than the latter, something congruent with the observed pattern in table 1. The gap 
                                               
5 See the appendix to find a complete list of the surveys used in each table. 
6 In figure 1 we use CIS data which reports about 4 percentage points more of unlocated voters in 1996 
and 2000 than CSES data.  
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remains fairly stable during all period with the exception of 1996 and 2000 elections, where 
the gap is considerably reduced. However, unlocated voters thoroughly vote in levels above 
70% in every election. In absolute terms, it means that around 14% of the votes come from 
unlocated voters in every election, which is somewhat lower than the average of CSES 
countries, but it is still a significant proportion. In brief, even small in numbers, unlocated 
voters still compose a relevant section of the electorate as to be brought into academic 
attention. In what follows we will try to analyse how they vote and why. 
 
 
 
3. How do Unlocated Voters vote? Evidence from Democratic Spain 
 
The results we have just presented point out that non-ideological voters have a potential 
significant influence on the electoral outcomes. However, unlocated voters will not become 
an important constituency unless they show a different voting behaviour compared with 
ideological voters. In this section we analyse whether the Spanish unlocated voters cast their 
ballot differently than the located ones. Thus, our null hypothesis will be that there is no 
difference between these two groups. If the null hypothesis is rejected we will have to 
provide plausible alternative hypothesis predicting the electoral behaviour of unlocated 
voters. Since there is no specific literature focused on this group of people we will need to 
rely on indirect research which we think may shed some light on the electoral patterns of this 
set of voters. 
 
Table 2 provides initial evidence against the null hypothesis as it points out that non-
ideological voters constitute a group that shares relevant socio-demographic traits. Logit 
models in this table show that unlocated voters are less educated and informed in all years 
except for 1979, where education has not a significant coefficient. Despite the fact that the 
literature regards ideology as a shortcut in order to save the cost of being informed, it seems 
that it requires some political awareness. The influence of sex is less clear. In almost all years 
the coefficient turns out to be positive, that is, women are more likely to be unlocated. 
However, we have only slight evidence as this coefficient is only significant in the half of our 
regressions. Finally, in most years the relation of age is curvilinear: it is firstly negative but 
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reaching the age about 45 years old the relation becomes positive. Therefore, younger and 
older people tend to be less ideological than middle ages. 
 
If these socio-demographic differences turn to be influential in the voting behaviour we 
will expect that they vote in a different fashion than ideological voters.  
 
 
Table 2. Logit models of not having an ideological self-location  
by socio-demographic variables 
Variables 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 
Sex 0.113 0.204 0.437*** 0.397*** 0.321*** -0.022 -0.017 0.091** 
 0.083   0.147 0.032 0.107 0.099 0.068 0.068 0.04 
Education -0.018 -0.183*** -0.19*** -0.059* -0.244*** -0.181*** -0.182*** -0.087*** 
 0.024 0.048 0.011 0.033 0.07 0.028 0.028 0.017 
Information -0.215*** -0.317*** -0.199*** -0.312*** -0.424*** -0.36*** -0.357*** -0.565*** 
 0.053    0.027 0.006 0.017 0.025 0.014 0.014 0.013 
Age 0.006*** -0.054** -0.014*** -0.042*** -0.032** -0.0024 -0.019** -0.013** 
 0.002 0.023 0.005 0.016 0.015 0.002 0.009 0.006 
Age2  0.001*** 0.0002*** 0.001*** 0.0003**  0.0002* 0.0001** 
  0.0002 0.00005 0.0001 0.0002  0.0001 0.00006 
Constant -1.667*** 2.069*** 0.474*** 1.124*** 1.413*** 1.165*** 1.491*** 0.792*** 
 0.269 0.671 0.145 0.463 0.411 0.197 0.273 0.157 
N 5362 1196 24989 2416 2488 5817 7398 22244 
R-squared 0.011 0.174 0.099 0.175 0.131 0.134 0.133 0.131 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
This preliminary finding is confirmed in table 3, which records vote choice in every 
Spanish election (from 1979 to 2004) for both ideological and non-ideological voters.7 
According to the table, the latter voters systematically show a larger inclination to vote for 
the incumbent. In six out of eight elections the unlocated support of incumbents is over 45 
percent. It only falls below this percentage in the two first elections. On the other side, 
                                               
7 This table is built by following the same procedure used in Carabaña (2001). Basically, we weigh the 
results found in the postelectoral survey by the actual results of the election in order to avoid misreporting of the 
real vote due to bandwagoning with the winner. 
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located voters never exceed the 41 percent. In addition, in all elections but in 1982,8 the party 
in government is always the political option most voted by non-ideological voters, even in 
1996 and 2000 when the government is defeated. And more importantly, the vote share for 
the incumbent is higher for the unlocated voters in all elections than for their ideological 
counterparts. The gap between these two types of voters goes from 3.27 points in 1982 to 
14.45 points in 1989. Remarkably, we see this incumbent advantage in governments of all 
ideologies: in left-wing governments (from 1982 to 1996), in right-wing governments (from 
1996 to 2004) and in centre-based governments (1979-1982). As a matter of fact, unlocated 
voters tend to be more loyal to the party in office regardless of its ideology. Moreover, this 
effect still works during economic recession periods (for instance, 1993) as well as periods of 
economic growth (for instance, 2000). Finally, it is also interesting to see how this pattern 
keeps taking place in 1982, 1996 and 2004 elections, when the incumbent was defeated. The 
unlocated voter is more unwilling to take their support away from the defeated incumbent but 
once the new government is settled, he becomes again a more incumbent supporter.  
 
Apart from the pro-incumbent bias, data show another relevant difference between 
these two groups. Unlocated voters have been always less interested in the leftist coalition, 
IU. It is especially noticeable in 1989 elections where the vote share of located voters is about 
four times the vote of unlocated voters. A possible explanation for that finding is the non-
ideological electorate does not feel attracted by parties with a strong ideological platform. 
The reason why the category “other parties” does not show a clear different pattern between 
unlocated and located voters may be caused by the fact that behind this category there are 
nationalist parties such as CiU or PNV, which are incumbents at the regional level where they 
have real chances of winning in particular constituencies in national elections.9 
 
                                               
8 Let’s explain why the incumbent got such a contemptible fraction of votes in 1982. Simply put, the 
centrist party built from the middle-aged cadres coming from the last regime collapsed because of the existence 
of diverse leaders without common interests among them. Then, the spectacular decay of the governmental 
UCD was predicted by the electorate very far beforehand (Gunther & Hopkin 2002). 
9 We leave this hypothesis open for further research. Since the main focus of this paper is to look at the 
Spanish parliament, we do not consider plausible interactions between electoral territorially-based arenas that 
might have an influence on the electoral behaviour of unlocated voters. For instance, an unlocated voter 
weighing the regional arena stronger than the national arena could try to vote for the regional incumbent not 
only in regional elections but also in national ones.  
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Table 3. Vote for parties by ideological placement in the Spanish elections 
 
Vote 
Ideological 
Voters 
Unlocated 
Voters 
Total 
Incumbent (UCD) 34.19 39.68 34.79 
PSOE 30.54 29.97 30.36 
PCE 10.85 9.96 10.76 
CD 6.10 5.60 6.05 
1979 
Others 18.32 15.80 18.04 
Incumbent (UCD-CDS) 9.04 12.31 9.47 
PSOE 47.42 46.72 47.33 
AP 25.65 27.53 25.89 
PCE 4.36 1.13 3.95 
1982 
Others 13.53 12.31 13.37 
Incumbent (PSOE) 41.07 46.83 41.75 
AP 24.62 24.55 24.61 
CDS 8.89 7.68 8.74 
IU 4.60 2.76 4.38 
1986 
Others 20.83 18.18 20.51 
Incumbent (PSOE) 38.02 52.47 39.87 
PP 26.86 19.88 25.96 
CDS 8.80 2.14 7.95 
IU 10.09 2.64 9.14 
1989 
Others 16.22 22.87 17.08 
Incumbent (PSOE) 37.81 47.94 39.07 
PP 35.69 30.97 35.10 
IU 10.28 5.37 9.67 
1993 
Others 16.22 15.71 16.16 
Incumbent (PSOE) 36.57 46.95 37.68 
PP 39.27 35.24 38.84 
IU 11.24 4.83 10.55 
1996 
Others 12.92 12.97 12.93 
Incumbent (PP) 41.85 53.02 43.07 
PSOE 33.58 28.63 33.04 
IU 8.62 2.24 7.92 
2000 
Others 15.96 16.12 15.97 
Incumbent (PP) 36.66 45.38 37.64 
PSOE 43.15 38.63 42.64 
IU 5.35 1.90 4.96 
2004 
 
Others 14.84 14.08 14.75 
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Data that we have just presented allow us to reject the null hypothesis: unlocated voters 
clearly do not behave in the same way as located voters when they cast their ballot. 
Moreover, table 3 also shows that there is a clear different pattern on voting behaviour among 
these two groups. The pro-incumbent bias of non-ideological voters is both significant and 
persistent over time. 
 
Then, how can we account for this differential political behaviour? If voters do not 
invest in having an ideology to make up their political opinions and to assess politics in 
general, we have basically left out with other three alternative shortcuts. First, voters may 
pick up a ballot by weighing strongly the performance of the party in office (Key 1966; 
Fiorina 1981a, Ferejohn 1986; Lewis-Beck 1988; Manin 1997; Przeworski, Manin and 
Stokes 1999). Thus, positive assessments of the incumbent’s performance will yield a vote 
for it. Second, voters may put their attention on the main traits of each candidate in the 
electoral race –to name only a few, if the candidate is knowledgeable, reliable or inspiring, 
and if the candidate performs a strong leadership within their ranks. As a matter of fact, 
better-equipped candidates will attract leadership-prone voters (King 2002; Wattenberger 
1991). Third, those voters rejecting prior shortcuts may still own an enduring leaning toward 
some of the parties in competition (Campbell et al 1960; Schickler & Green 1997; Bartels 
2000). Party Identification allows the parties to gather votes from partisans regardless of 
whether their performance was good enough, since the followers of a concrete party will 
always think that party rivals will do the job worse. 
 
By building from those potential alternative shortcuts, we throw out three hypotheses 
that may explain the differences between located and unlocated voters.  The first hypothesis 
comes from retrospective voting literature, where some authors consider that governments are 
less accountable to ideological voters because ideology constrains the effect of government 
performance on voting calculus. Therefore, unlocated voters would vote more for the 
incumbent because of their better evaluations of the incumbent’s job in office. Although 
anecdotal evidence10 puts some caution on this hypothesis, we will need better tests in order 
to determine its validity. 
                                               
10 Unlocated voters show a pro-incumbent bias even in 1993 and 1996 when the economic performance 
of the social-democratic government was manifestly poor. For instance, in 1993 the Spanish economy was in its 
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The second hypothesis would emphasise that unlocated voters vote more for the 
incumbent because they give more importance to candidate evaluations than ideological 
voters. The mechanism would go as follows: voters without ideology will rely heavily on 
leader characteristics when voting. Provided that incumbents get more visibility than 
challengers, unlocated voters will turn out for the incumbent in higher numbers than for 
potential rivals. We already know that incumbents have always an advantage in terms of 
higher popularity than challengers as long as they control the political agenda and monitor the 
media. As a matter of fact, the unlocated propensity to vote for the incumbent could be driven 
by better evaluations of the incumbent’s leadership and/or higher importance laid on 
leadership when voting. 
 
Finally, the third hypothesis would underline that those not having ideology may still 
consider themselves as followers of concrete parties with the result of voting for them 
regardless of their performance in office. The argument is straightforward: to get information 
about politics is costly and hardly profitable. Subsequently, unlocated voters will prefer to 
invest in building a strong party identification by exchanging party loyalty for resources –
whatever they are. Unfortunately, “party identification” has not been a topic extensively 
investigated in Europe, since this variable has been traditionally rejected under charges of 
being a pure correlate of the vote. In so being, we have not been able to collect enough data 
as to run models for the whole range of Spanish elections. Notwithstanding this caveat, we 
will present a couple of tests for this hypothesis. 
 
In the following two sections we will present more extensively the hypotheses that we 
have just pointed out and we will test their empirical validity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
worst moment with a negative growth of 1.2 points, one below the European Union average, and with the 
unemployment rate climbing up to 24 percent. 
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4. The effects of government performance 
 
It is reasonable to think that voters with no ideology would rely in other types of 
shortcuts. As they report lower levels of information about politics (see table 2), the need of 
alternative shortcuts becomes even more important. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that 
instead of using ideology as a shortcut, non-ideological voters decide to use government 
performance as a substitute in facilitating their voting decision. As accountability theories 
based on retrospective voting models focus on government performance as a sort of electoral 
shortcut, they may be helpful to throw light on how non-ideological voters behave. 
 
In general, this field of research supports government’s economic performance using 
the same kind of arguments present in the spatial theory of politics when explaining ideology 
as a shortcut. For instance, Kinder & Kiewiet hold that “since most citizens are indifferent to 
and generally poorly informed about much of what happens in political life what is required 
for them doing political judgements is much more tractable: merely that they form 
impressions of how the economy is performing, of what national problems seem the most 
pressing, and of how the incumbent administration is handling economic issues and 
problems” (1981: 156). In brief, individual evaluations of the incumbent’s performance could 
do the same job as ideology currently does. 
 
Precisely, for the way of reasoning implied in retrospective voting, this literature states 
that incumbents have an outstanding advantage relative to challengers, which is coherent with 
our results in table 3. To account for this finding almost all the authors rely on the same sorts 
of explanations: incumbents, either politicians or parties, have an observable record whereas 
challengers do not have it (Ragsdale 1981). Obviously, challengers trying to defeat the 
incumbent do not have the same weapons at their disposal. 
 
Traditionally, all these accountability models have either overlooked or just consider 
ideology as a control variable. However recent research on accountability models has stood 
out very different conclusions. Stokes (1996) and Maravall & Przeworski (1998) in their 
application of the Stokes’ model for the Spanish case have found that ideology mediates the 
relation between vote choice and government performance. Government responsibility of 
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economic conditions is filtered by voter’s ideological lens: for instance, those voters closer to 
the government may look for exogenous causes to explain economic crisis and, contrarily, 
they may consider as an incumbent merit when the economy is in good health. Hence, 
governments can be rewarded or punished regardless of its actual performance in office when 
ideology is taken into account. 
 
An implication of this theory is that we should expect that voters without ideological 
lens will follow a stronger pattern of economic voting. Therefore, governments should be 
more accountable to non-ideological voters for their performance. The arguments of these 
authors strengthen the hypothesis that a reasonable alternative heuristics for non-ideological 
voters may be incumbent performance. 
 
Though, we have seen in the previous section that unlocated voters have a systematic 
incumbent bias even in economic crisis, which apparently seems incompatible with 
retrospective voting. One possible explanation is that these voters always report better 
evaluations of government performance and, as a result, they punish them in less extent. 
Table 4, which collects average evaluations of the incumbent’s performance for the whole 
range of Spanish elections out of 1979,11 clearly shows that this is not the case. In seven out 
of eight elections unlocated voters showed on average less positive evaluations than their 
counterparts –only in 1982 they plainly report a better opinion of the incumbent’s job.  No 
doubt this result freezes potential interpretations of the incumbent bias emphasising larger 
positive unlocated evaluations of the incumbent’s performance.12 
 
Yet, we need stronger statistical methods to convincingly show that being an unlocated 
voter really means something different from being a voter weighing incumbent’s 
performance uppermost. Even though we have already illustrated that the incumbent bias 
                                               
11 See foot note 13 below for a description of the data we used to build this table. 
12 A counter-critique would underline that unlocated voters might have fewer better evaluations and at 
the same time larger mean evaluations of the performance. For example, in 1986 ideological voters have a four-
point percentual gap in positive evaluations of the incumbent ahead from non-ideological voters. However, they 
have on average an evaluation of 3.4 points, whereas unlocated voters take 3.6 on average. If we run test of 
mean differences for all the Elections we will come up with no significant positive results. In brief, unlocated 
voters do not hold better evaluations of the government’s performance than ideological voters.  
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Table 4. Voter’s evaluations of the incumbent’s performance 
Election year Performance Ideological voters Unlocated voters Total 
Can't complain 45.54 45.50 45.54 
1979 
Very serious 54.46 54.50 54.46 
Not government responsibility(a) 69.45 80.54 70.8 1982 
Government responsibility 30.55 19.46 29.2 
 Very good/Good 33.30 27.53 32.06 
1986 Average 46.63 52.56 47.9 
 Bad/Very bad 20.08 19.90 20.04 
 Very good/Good 34.14 24.69 32.06 
1989 Average 46.19 52.65 47.62 
 Bad/Very bad 19.67 22.65 20.33 
 Very good/Good 7.75 6.28 7.35 
1993 Average 38.82 38.27 38.67 
 Bad/Very bad 53.43 55.45 53.99 
 Very good/Good 11.48 7.57 10.58 
1996 Average 43.72 41.25 43.15 
 Bad/Very bad 44.79 51.17 46.26 
 Very good/Good 44.78 40.68 44.11 
2000 Average 38.78 44.62 39.74 
 Bad/Very bad 16.44 14.70 16.16 
 Very good/Good 31.55 30.64 31.41 
2004 Average 38.86 48.06 40.33 
 Bad/Very bad 29.59 21.29 28.27 
 
 
does not seem to be led by better unlocated evaluations of the incumbent’s performance, 
more robust proofs will be presented below. Basically, we shall run statistical models of the 
vote for the incumbent by taking into account ideological placement as well as performance 
evaluation.13 We shall do it in a three-step process: First, we shall demonstrate whether being 
                                               
13 The post-electoral CIS surveys that we used in previous section do not have items on incumbent’s 
performance. Thus, we had to recur to alternative data that includes performance: for 1982-2004 elections we 
use pre-electoral CIS surveys (see the appendix for its complete list) and for 1979 we use DATA survey. 
However, pre-electoral surveys do not go without fault: they report lower percentages of people voting at all – 
because of the “not decided yet” item. For this reason, we expect our results will be conservative with respect to 
the incumbent bias hypothesis, since potential unlocated voters may be part of the undecided group in higher 
numbers than potential ideological voters. 
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an unlocated voter still makes a difference on the odds of voting for the incumbent on its own 
(model A);14 Second, we shall include individual evaluations of the government’s 
performance in the model to check whether the individual effect of being an unlocated still 
remains (model B); Finally, we shall run several refinements of the last model to verify that 
our findings are robust enough (models C and D). 
 
Models A15 in table 5 confirm our previous finding that being an unlocated makes an 
influence on the odds of voting for the incumbent: 7 out of 8 elections report significant and 
positive coefficients. Only the 1982 model comes up with a non-significant coefficient for 
unlocated. 
 
Once we have checked the reliability of the data, we will go back to the performance 
hypothesis. As indicated above, the literature on economic voting has assumed that voters 
usually take the incumbent’s performance into account as a shortcut to cast their ballot. As a 
matter of fact, to have an ideological location would not enclose a big effect on the way in 
which people vote. 
 
To test that, the second model (model B) for each election takes under control if the 
voter has an ideological position or does not and her evaluation of the incumbent’s 
performance. Leaving model 1982B aside, only in model 1993B the effect of not being 
located in the ideological continuum disappears when incorporating individual evaluations of 
performance into the model. The rest of B models keep significant coefficients with the 
expected positive sign for the unlocated. Thus, we can be confident that being a non-
ideological voter makes a difference in terms of higher odds of voting for the incumbent 
regardless of the huge effect that performance evaluations have on that probability. 
 
 
                                               
14 As we indicated in foot note 13 above, use of preelectoral surveys could plausibly dwarf the incumbent 
effect that we found when working with postelectoral surveys. For this reason, our first model tests again this 
finding. 
15 From now on, all models run logit regressions with voting for the incumbent vs. vote for all other 
parties as their dependent variable. On the statistical premises of those models, see Long & Freese 2003. 
  
Table 5. Logit models of voting for the incumbent by performance in the Spanish elections, 1979-2004 
Elections 1979 1982 1986 1989 
Variables 1979A 1979B 1979C 1982A 1982B 1982C 1986A 1986B 1986C 1986D 1989A 1989B 1989C 
Unlocated 0.277*** 0.256** 0.142 -0.069 -0.183 -0.315 0.279*** 0.417***  1.264*** 0.387** 0.604*** 0.726*** 0.419 
 0.109 0.113 0.366 0.396 0.490 1.759 0.057 0.063 0.188 0.184 0.165 0.216 1.490 
Performance   -0.657***  -0.664***  0.281**** 0.280***   0.905***  0.944*** 0.320***   2.332***  2.324*** 
  0.068 0.072  0.097 0.098  0.024 0.026 0.024  0.128 0.133 
Interaction   0.074   0.056    -0.355*** -0.032   0.100 
   0.226   0.707   0.074 0.073   0.478 
Constant  -0.348*** 0.650*** 0.661***  -1.929***  -2.685***  -2.682*** 0.271***  -2.069***  -2.169***  -0.549*** 0.130**  -7.350***  -7.324*** 
 0.035 0.109 0.114 0.122 0.279 0.281 0.018 0.064 0.068 0.064 0.056 0.415 0.432 
N 3729 3650 3650 674 602 602 14071 13649 13649 13574 1484 1431 1431 
Prob>Chi2 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 0.861 0.019 0.048 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0013 0.0199 0.0200 0.000 0.018 0.018 0.0013 0.0915 0.0927 0.012 0.0068 0.3445 0.3445 
 
Elections 1993 1996 2000 2004 
Variables 1993A 1993B 1993C 1996A 1996B 1996C 2000A 2000B 2000C 2000D 2004A 2004B 2004C 
Unlocated 0.276** 0.236 1.118** 0.441*** 0.455*** 0.956*** 0.312*** 0.447*** 3.157*** -0.057 0.465*** 0.418*** 2.248*** 
 0.143 0.160 0.510 0.081 0.090 0.323 0.083 0.106 0.505 0.429 0.057 0.080 0.442 
Performance   1.113***  1.174***  1.086*** 1.119***   1.899***  2.018*** 0.619***   2.695***  2.750*** 
  0.076 0.085  0.045 0.050  0.057 0.063 0.047  0.043 0.046 
Interaction    -0.352*    -0.188*    -0.797*** 0.178    -0.561*** 
   0.195   0.117   0.145 0.124   0.133 
Constant  -0.430***  -3.195***  -3.352***  -0.616***  -3.529***  -3.620***  -0.169***  -6.670***  -7.086***  -2.405***  -0.358***  -9.029***  -9.213*** 
 0.058 0.205 0.227 0.339 0.131 0.144 0.030 0.203 0.224 0.173 0.017 0.144 0.153 
N 1500 1486 1486 4572 4501 4501 5165 5007 5007 5007 14981 14831 14831 
Prob>Chi2 0.0549 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.000 0.000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0018 0.1366 0.1382 0.0049 0.126 0.126 0.0020 0.2685 0.2724 0.038 0.0032 0.4594 0.4602 
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In spite of that, further proofs are necessary in order to make the unlocated bias more 
empirically robust. For instance, a defender of the performance hypothesis may claim that the 
key coefficient to look for is the interaction between performance and unlocated, since her 
theory would call for a higher effect of performance on those not having ideology. To check 
this claim we run C models. By building from B models, we incorporate the interactive effect 
of being an unlocated by performance. The results do not afford any empirical support for 
that expected higher effect of the performance evaluations on unlocated voters. Rather on the 
contrary, when significant, the effect of performance on the odds of voting for the incumbent 
for unlocated voters is lower. 
 
For instance, by building from model 1986C we can simulate the odds of voting for the 
incumbent in that year. An ideological voter evaluating very positively the incumbent’s 
performance has a probability of voting for the current government around 92%, while a non-
ideological voter has only two more points ahead. Instead, an ideological voter with the most 
negative evaluation of the government has a 24% chance of voting for the incumbent, while a 
non-ideological voter with similar performance’s evaluations shows a 32% probability. In 
other words, a two-point gap when the performance evaluation is very good turns out to be a 
nine-point gap when the evaluations are very bad. Therefore, unlocated voters seem to be 
more reluctant to relinquish from the incumbent files as long as the evaluations get worse -or 
just the way around: ideological voters show a steeper slope in their relationship between 
performance evaluations and odds for voting the incumbent than their non-ideological 
fellows. 
 
It could be the case that performance evaluations of ideological voters are mediated by 
their party identification and their location in the ideological dimension. For instance, we 
may observe higher coefficients for ideological voters because performance evaluations are 
influenced by how voters are ideologically close to the party in government. Once we 
discount the projection effect of ideology and party identification on individual evaluations of 
the incumbent’s performance, we would come up with clearly higher coefficients for the 
unlocated. 
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In order to check this, we finally run D models.16 The results of these new two models 
confirm previous findings: once the projection effects of ideology and party identification 
likewise are discounted, performance does not have a bigger effect for those not having 
ideological positioning compared to those ideologically located. Figures 2 and 3 trace out the 
effect of performance (with and without projection effect discount –models D and C, 
respectively) on voting for the incumbent for both ideological and unlocated voters.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 clearly show that if we do not take the projection effect into account the 
slope of  ideological voters is bigger, which means that votes from ideological voters are 
more responsive to how government performs the economy. In other words, when the 
economy goes bad, voters with ideology have a lower probability to vote for the incumbent, 
but the opposite happens when the economy is in good health. However, the difference 
between our two groups is considerably reduced when we discount the projection effects 
from voter’s economic performance evaluations. This is especially visible in the 1986 case, 
where the slope of the curve is virtually the same for both ideological and non-ideological 
voters. Hence, we can be confident to reject the hypothesis: non-ideological voters do not 
take performance much more into account when picking a ballot. 
 
 
Figure 2. Odds of voting for the incumbent by performance, 1986 
 
                                               
16 Models D are only run in 1986 and 2000 because of the lack of a good proxy for party identification in 
the remaining years. The methodology used to discount the projection effects of party identification and 
ideology is explained in appendix A. 
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Figure 3. Odds of voting for the incumbent by performance, 2000 
 
 
 
 
5. The effects of leadership and party identification 
 
In this section, we will test if candidate evaluation and/or party identification may 
account for the incumbent bias that non-ideological voters persistently show. We will focus 
mainly on the effect of leadership on voting, since there is no enough data as to offer decisive 
results on the party identification hypothesis. 
 
The literature on the effect of candidate evaluation on the vote is far from conclusive. 
On the one hand, several authors (Bartle 2005; King 2002; Wattenberger 1991) have 
emphasised the strong effect of leadership over those voters not using other relevant shortcuts 
to vote. On the other hand, mainstream electoral studies downgrade that effect by 
highlighting that the strong correlation between vote and candidate evaluation is a by-product 
of other underlying mechanisms not correctly captured by the models. In fact, according to 
this literature, candidates’ traits have, at best, an indirect influence on the vote caused by 
respondent’s more general political attitudes such as ideology, partisanship or evaluations 
about candidate performance (Bartels 2002). 
 
A radical version of these mild effects of candidate’s evaluations on voting is to neglect 
having any role at all (Brettschneider & Gabriel 2002), according to this view voters are 
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attached to more long-standing political phenomena than the simple opinion about 
candidate’s character. However, once again, all of these studies either in favour or against are 
focused on ideological voters without saying anything specific about the implications of 
candidate-centered politics for non-ideological voters. Only Bartels, in the article cited 
mentions the possibility of stronger effects of candidate evaluations on voting for moderate 
voters (those not holding strong PID or who are ideologically moderates). 
 
However, the empirical evidence seems to refute this hypothesis. As far as we know, 
only a recent article by Lavine and Gschwend (2005) deals with the very interrogating 
question of how voters with different levels of ideological capacity make up their minds in 
order to cast their vote. Using US data between 1984 and 2000, they found that voters use 
different shortcuts according to their level of political sophistication.17 Even though issue 
voting is highly costly, ideology allows voters to form political opinions on different topics. 
Instead, non-ideological voters use PID and assessments of candidate character when 
deciding whom to vote. 
 
In this section, our empirical analysis is designed to test to what extent these findings 
hold also in the Spanish case. Table 6 reproduces the same statistical procedure that we used 
in table 5. First, A models only include unlocated together with leadership. Second, B models 
test whether the effect of leadership is higher for non-ideological voters than for their 
ideological counterparts.  
 
Again, our relevant independent variable (unlocated) turns out significant coefficients 
in 1986, 1989, 1996 and 2004 (models A). On the contrary, to be a voter without ideology 
does not make a difference on the odds of voting for the incumbent in the rest of elections –
that is, 1979, 1993 and 2000- once we take voter evaluations of the incumbent under control. 
Given that performance already drove unlocated out of significancy in 1979 and 1993, only 
                                               
17 They measured political sophistication through the concept of “ideological capacity”, that is, the 
variation in the level of “think[ing] abstractly about politics and form policy attitudes and other political beliefs 
that cohere both with their abstract ideological identifications and with each other”.  
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Table 6. Logit models of voting for the incumbent by leadership evaluation 
 in the Spanish elections, 1979-2004 
Elections 1979 1982 1986 1989 
Variables 1979A 1979B 1982A 1982B 1986A 1986B 1989A 1989B 
Unlocated 0.186 0.229 0.407 2.779*** 0.492*** 2.082*** 0.784*** 1.677** 
 0.138 0.550 0.555 1.161 0.092 0.259 0.263 0.861 
Leadership 0.645*** 0.646*** 0.523*** 0.568*** 0.694*** 0.720*** 0.853*** 0.869*** 
 0.022 0.023 0.067 0.073 0.013 0.014 0.045 0.048 
Interaction  -0.006   -.3767**   -.234***  -0.143 
  0.073  0.182  0.036  0.132 
Constant  -4.979***  -4.984***  -5.415***  -5.750***  -4.632***  -4.814***  -5.559***  -5.671*** 
 0.167 0.175 0.508 0.559 0.094 0.101 0.316 0.337 
N 3673 3673 596 596 12191 12191 1357 1357 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.317 0.317 0.210 0.219 0.353 0.355 0.424 0.424 
 
Elections 1993 1996 2000 2004 
Variables 1993A 1993B 1996A 1996B 2000A 2000B 2004A 2004B 
Unlocated -0.087 -0.667 0.404*** 1.645*** 0.172 1.656*** 0.488*** 3.103*** 
 0.225 0.926 0.129 0.415 0.119 0.376 0.097 0.341 
Leadership 0.715*** 0.705*** 0.738*** 0.769*** 0.643*** 0.670*** 0.962*** 0.998*** 
 0.039 0.042 0.022 0.025 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.018 
Interaction  0.078   -0.165***   -0.210***   -0.379*** 
  0.120  0.053  0.051  0.048 
Constant  -5.318***  -5.244***  -5.907***  -6.145***  -4.523***  -4.715***  -6.839***  -7.094*** 
 0.292 0.310 0.178 0.200 0.140 0.152 0.120 0.128 
N 1377 1377 4354 4354 4887 4887 13634 13634 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.391 0.391 0.431 0.432 0.326 0.328 0.463 0.466 
 
 
in 200018 leadership makes unlocated non-significant. For the rest of the elections, it is easy 
to observe that being an unlocated voter remains a robust predictor of voting for the 
incumbent. 
 
Yet, before taking strong conclusions, we need to look at models B. It could be possible 
that both types of voters bear candidate evaluation into mind when voting, but those without 
                                               
18 The 2000 model is very sensitive to how it is specified. If we incorporate performance into the model, 
then unlocated recovers a significant coefficient. The same happens when socio-demographic controls are 
included -see table 8, model 2000E. 
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ideological self-location give more weight to the evaluation of the incumbent’s leadership. 
Once more we have to reject the hypothesis, since in no election did unlocated voters show a 
higher positive influence of the incumbent’s evaluation on the odds of voting for the 
incumbent than ideological voters. In sum, we are confident that leadership evaluations of the 
incumbent do not depress the effect of having no ideology over the chances of picking the re-
election ticket. 
 
To finish with, we ask whether party identification can bring down the effect of 
unlocated. We recognise that “party identification” works as a second-best type of shortcut 
for voters willing to vote without spending too many resources in political information. 
However, there are important reasons to be cautious with this shortcut, at least in the 
European context where party identification tends to vary much more than in the US context 
and there is also a high correlation between vote recall and party identification (Barnes 1990). 
 
First, voters without ideology exhibit strong lack of “party identification”. That is true 
for all the countries included in the CSES database –with the only exception of 1997 Great 
Britain, 2000 Mexico, 1996 Australia, and 1996 Israel- as well as for Spain.19 Second, 
practical matters prevent us from analysing party identification in Spain due to the high 
correlation between vote and party identification on the one hand (for instance, in 2000 only 
0.79% out of all socialist partisans did not vote for their party); and the absence of good items 
in Spanish surveys to study “party identification” on the other. Only the 1986 and 2000 
preelectoral surveys include clear items on that topic. In both of them, the Spanish unlocated 
voters openly present lower numbers of party identification than ideological voters (for 
instance, in 2000 three out of four unlocated voters did not manifest to have “party 
identification” opposite to half of ideological voters). All these caveats arise doubts on the 
potential results coming from the use of this shortcut with the data available. However, we 
still run models for both elections that are included in table 7. 
 
 
                                               
19 For instance, in 2000 Spain only 58% of the electorate did recognise to have a party leaning. While 
63% of ideological voters reported to have party identification, this figure went down to 31% for unlocated 
voters.  
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Table 7. Logit models of voting for the incumbent by party identification, 1986 and 2000 
Variables 1986pid 2000pid 
Unlocated 0.947*** 0.506*** 
 (0.072) (0.098) 
Pro-govn Partisans 3.351*** 5.226*** 
 (0.056) (0.339) 
Anti-govn Partisans  -3.304***  -3.256*** 
 (0.119) (0.205) 
Constant  -0.852***  -0.425*** 
 (0.034) (0.040) 
N 14071 5165 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.464 0.376 
 
 
Doubtless to say, the incorporation of Party Identification in the 1986 and 2000 models 
pushes extraordinarily up the general fit of the models, which is partial evidence of high 
correlation between being a partisan and to vote for your favourite party. Despite that better 
fit, unlocated still works in the expected direction and with a very significant coefficient. In 
few words, even though we take Party Identification under control, voters without ideological 
leanings tend to vote for the incumbent in higher numbers than their ideological counterparts. 
 
 
 
6. The incumbency advantage: the effects of education and information 
 
How can we account for this incumbent bias pattern of voting if it is not explained by 
the main shortcuts? We tackle this question in this last empirical section. 
 
There are some interesting works devoted to explaining the pro-incumbent bias effect 
in American politics that give us interesting insights applicable to non-ideological voters. A 
considerable amount of this literature use aggregate data in order to find which specific 
government resources (i.e. case-work services, transfers, informational saliency) explain his 
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advantage over the challenger (Mayhew 1974, Cover 1977, Fiorina 1981b, Cox & 
Morgenstern 1995). However, these findings usually cannot shed much light on what 
particular characteristics of unlocated voters make them more biased toward the government. 
 
Instead Erikson’s work (1972) looks more useful, regardless of still working with 
aggregate data. He considers that the increase of independent voters in the 60s may be behind 
the rise of the incumbency advantage in the US. Indeed, the lack of partisan attachments 
would lead to the enhancement of the incumbent’s visibility in voter decisions (172: 1240). 
This finding has been more rigorously confirmed by investigations at the individual level, 
either using cross-sectional data (Ferejohn 1977; Cox & Katz 1996) or panel data (Romero 
and Sanders 1994). A plausible implication is that the same may be said for those with no 
ideological attachments, as long as we know political competition in Europe is made up 
around ideology attachments rather than party identification (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). 
 
Finally, Bartels (1996) finds a very interesting pattern of electoral behaviour among 
less informed voters for the American context. He stands out that relatively uninformed 
voters are more likely, other things being equal, to support parties in government and 
Democrats. On average, Democrats perform almost two percentage points better and 
incumbents do almost five percentage points better than they would if all voters in 
presidential elections were, in fact, fully informed. He suggests that perhaps supporting the 
incumbent is simply a kind of natural default option for voters too uninformed to compare the 
candidates on their merits. And his conclusions point to the same directions that ours: 
“Whatever the sources of the aggregate discrepancies between actual vote choice and 
hypothetical fully informed vote choice may be, however, they suggest very clearly that 
political ignorance has systematic and significant political consequences.”(1996: 220) 
 
If Erikson considers that being non-partisan has an impact per se on incumbent saliency 
and electoral advantage, Bartels finds a possible causal chain between them. It may be 
possible that non-partisan voters have lower information levels which it would explain why 
they tend to vote more for the incumbent. The parallelism with the unlocated voters strongly 
emerges as we take into account that this type of voters are less educated and informed about 
politics (see table 2). 
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In models E, we include personal characteristics (sex, age, education and information) 
together with performance, leadership and party identification.20 We are especially interested 
in picking up the effect of political information: either directly (with the “information” 
variable) or indirectly (through education levels). If we hypothesize that the incumbent bias 
of non-ideological voters is led by their lack of information, then we should expect the 
unlocated coefficient to become non significant.  
 
The results included in table 8 do not show a clear pattern. In most elections (1986, 
1989, 2000 and 2004) the incumbency bias of unlocated voters remains significant, but the 
opposite occurs in the 1979 and 1996 elections.21 In these latter elections, the disappearance 
of the unlocated effect cannot be due to political information since this variable is not 
significant. Instead, age and education stand out as the relevant variables in both elections.  
Data supports Bartels’ hypothesis in the sense that less political knowledge (information) 
inflates the odds of voting for the incumbent information.22 But results also confirm that not 
being constrained by ideological positions enhances on its own the strength of the incumbent 
as Erickson would predict for non partisan voters. 
 
The results thus do not seem to clarify the causal mechanism that is behind the relation 
of not having an ideology and voting for the incumbent. It is difficult to think about 
governmental-particularised benefits or services such as transfers or constituency casework, 
as plentifully focused to non-ideological voters. They tend to be older people, which imply 
that they are net receptors of pensions and other social transfers. But this is not what is behind 
the incumbent bias. Elderly people vote more for the incumbent in most elections, except for 
the 1986 and 1989 elections where, surprisingly, the relation is reversed. However, age is 
only influential in dropping the significance of unlocated variable in a couple of elections 
(1979 and 1996), though with the support of other variables. Neither can unemployment 
                                               
20 A detailed account of how variables are built is included in the appendix. 
21 Additionally, in a couple of elections unlocated reports non-significant coefficients either when on its 
own (1982) or when taking performance under control (1993). 
22 This result is much more robust for the PSOE-based governments than for the PP ones, which points to 
plausible different socio-demographic profiles of the unlocated in those long government periods. 
- 27 - 
 
 
 
Table 8. Voting for the incumbent by taking social characteristics under control 
 1979E 1982E 1986E 1989E 1993E 1996E 2000E 2004E 
Unlocated 0.101 0.577 0.736*** 0.633*** -0.326 0.091 0.331** 0.379*** 
 0.146 0.569 0.112 0.289 0.247 0.176 0.146 0.118 
Performance  -0.210*** 0.280*** 0.428*** 1.395*** 0.571*** 0.686*** 0.938*** 2.101*** 
 0.088 0.123 0.042 0.152 0.102 0.074 0.081 0.053 
Leadership 0.611*** 0.490*** 0.456*** 0.648*** 0.666*** 0.681*** 0.413*** 0.713*** 
 0.023 0.073 0.016 0.050 0.041 0.029 0.025 0.020 
 0.092 0.317 0.065 0.173 0.157 0.111 0.096 0.063 
Age 0.020*** 0.020**  -0.018***  -0.020*** -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.000 
 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Education 0.021 -0.050  -0.248***  -0.159***  -0.479***  -0.370*** 0.004 -0.027 
 0.026 0.083 0.020 0.050 0.103 0.068 0.035 0.024 
Information  -0.254*** 0.036  -0.052***  -0.111**  -0.313***  -0.404* -0.033 -0.006 
 0.059 0.309 0.017 0.057 0.089 0.229 0.031 0.024 
Pro-govnt 
Partisans 
      
   
2.660*** 
0.067 
   
4.794*** 
0.363 
 
Pro-oppo 
Partisans 
      
   
-2.998*** 
0.138 
   
-2.816*** 
0.221 
 
Sex 0.170911* 0.252 0.090 0.031 0.066 0.277*** 0.283*** 0.135*** 
Constant  -4.982***  -7.160***  -2.979***  -6.480***  -3.981***  -5.534***  -6.720***  -1.207*** 
 0.378 2.430 0.261 0.842 0.702 1.002 0.437 0.287 
N 3552 554 11793 1318 1364 2968 4782 12755 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.336 0.227 0.593 0.500 0.432 0.434 0.558 0.599 
 
 
benefits explain incumbency bias as non-ideological voters do not have a different propensity 
to being unemployed.23 
 
A possible alternative explanation would say that this bias is not caused by the lack of 
information but by the source of information that unlocated voters use. It may be the case that 
these voters are more likely to pay attention to those media biased toward the incumbent. In 
                                               
23 Voters with no ideology are underrepresented within employed population, but this is not due to 
unemployment but to retired people and housewives (or husbands). Data is available on request.  
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the Spanish case, for instance, there is some evidence that goes in that direction. Table 9 
reports TV channel preferences of Spanish voters in two different years, 1993 and 2004.24 It 
is interesting to see that unlocated voters are more prone to watch those channels that favour 
the government. In 1993, when the socialist PSOE was in office, unlocated voters were more 
likely to watch the pro-governmental public station (TVE1). In contrast, the pro-conservative 
Antena3 channel was more likely to be watched by located voters.  Similar results come out 
from 2004, when government was held by the conservative PP. In this year also appears a 
correlation between unlocated voters and pro-incumbent media. 
 
 
Table 9. TV audience and party favouritism according to the electorate 
     Tv watched by… Tv favours… 
 Located Unlocated PP PSOE Others 
TVE1      
1993 59 65.4 2 97.3 0.67 
2004 40.2 46.4 88.1 7.6 4.3 
TELE5      
1993 11.5 11.5 17.65 82.35 0 
2004 40.7 29.72 23.3 72.5 4.2 
ANTENA3      
1993 23 13.5 75.9 24.1 0 
2004 15.6 21 74 20 6 
OTHERS      
1993 6.5 9.6 0 14.3 85.7 
2004 3.4 2.8 0 62.5 37.5 
 
 
There is evidence elsewhere that the electoral influence of the media is especially 
important for those voters with weak ideological attitudes (Gunther, Montero and Wert, 
                                               
24 See appendix on data used in this table. In these surveys, people are asked about channel preferences 
and about which political party favour them. We cannot complete the series for other years because there is no 
survey apart from these two that contain the suitable data. 
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1999). Therefore, the potential influence of this incumbent-biased media on unlocated voters 
is especially worth taking into consideration. 
 
However, it is difficult to explain why this pattern occurs. It is reasonable to think that 
they prefer TVE1 because unlocated voters are older people, who have always been loyal to 
the first national channel. But it is less clear the patterns that we found for private-channel 
preferences. Perhaps we might seek the answer in the pro-governmental behaviour of those 
private TV stations in different time-periods. Thus, and according to the interviewed, while 
Telecinco showed a clear-cut support for the PSOE government in 1993, Antena3 did the 
same with respect to the PP government in 2004; exactly the same bias that we found in the 
TV patterns of the unlocated. 
 
In so doing, it looks as if non-ideological voters were able to follow the steps of the 
current government until watching those channels closer to it. In other words, unlocated 
voters would update their channel preferences by taking into account which party takes over 
the government. In that sense, channel preference would be a by-product of party preference. 
 
The results appearing in this section do not clearly show the causal mechanism that is 
behind the incumbency bias of non-ideological voters. In some election years it can be 
explained by differential levels of information, education and age. However, most years 
remain with no answer. Further research has to focus on which unmeasured incumbency 
resources make him more visible for unlocated voters compared with their counterparts. But 
it could be the case that this incumbency bias is not related with governmental resources or 
strategies, but instead it may essentially be voter attitude’s related. As Mayhew (1974) 
hypothesised “incumbency cue” may be a plausible alternative for voters that lack party 
identification. Possibly, the absence of ideology may lead to the same outcome. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This article started from the idea that electoral studies have to pay more attention to 
those voters having no ideology. We saw that the numerical relevance of this group varies 
across countries, but in most of them they are sufficient as to deserve the study of their 
electoral behaviour. Focusing in the electoral patterns of Spanish non-ideological citizens we 
found that they tend to vote more for the party in government. This incumbency bias has 
taken place in all but one Spanish election since democracy came back in 1979 regardless of 
the ideological tendency of the party in office. As non-ideological voters represent about one 
fifth of the Spanish electorate, this bias has important implications for the chances of 
government re-election. 
 
We have tested if alternative shortcuts could account for the way in which unlocated 
voters vote. Concretely, we have considered the effects of the incumbent’s economic 
performance and leadership evaluation and party identification on the odds of voting for the 
incumbent. On the one hand, we do not find conclusive evidence that the pro-incumbent bias 
of non-ideological voters is a statistical artefact that disappears when bringing those 
alternative shortcuts into the models. 
 
On the other hand, we do not find support for the hypothesis that non-ideological voters 
take incumbent performance or candidate evaluation more into account than their ideological 
counterparts when they vote. The lack of the ideological shortcut does not seem to push these 
voters to use these heuristics in a differential fashion. 
 
We neither find support that behind this behaviour of non-ideological voters lies the 
lack of political information as Bartels suggests for explaining the incumbency bias in 
American politics. However, there is some tentative evidence that this group of voters tend to 
watch TV channels that favours the government. This fact points out that there may be some 
factors that we cannot observe that make governments more visible to citizens without 
ideology. 
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It is not surprising for us that non-ideological voters behave differently as several 
findings in political science have proved the key position of ideology in the vote choice. 
Hence, it does not seem implausible to think that having no ideology apparently must have 
some implication in how voters rationalize their decisions in politics. What is more puzzling 
is the specific pattern that emerges from the Spanish case. As the incumbency advantage 
persist in most years after introducing our controls, many questions remain without answer. 
Future research has to continue exploring what specific features allow governments to be 
more attractive to non-ideological voters and what kind of heuristics these voters have in their 
minds when they vote for the incumbent. The research agenda must not be limited to Spain; it 
is important to find out whether this incumbent bias can be generalised to other countries or if 
it is rather a “country effect”. But, as we already know that ideology has analogous 
implications on political behaviour of different countries, it is reasonable to expect the same 
with the lack of ideology. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
 
Discounting party identification and ideology on incumbent performance evaluations 
 
In model C, where the interaction between government performance and unlocated is 
introduced, we have found the counterintuitive result that the government is not more 
accountable to non-ideological voters. Besides, some models report that the effect of 
performance is even significantly higher for ideological voters. We hypothesize that this fact 
may be due to a projection effect. In order to solve these problems we discount both the effect 
of ideology and party identification in the following way: 
 
Ideology. In order to discount the distortion caused by ideology on government 
performance we need to make an assumption of how performance is biased by this variable. 
The method and assumption that we use is inspired in Merrill and Grofman (1999) work. We 
assume that the distortion of government performance is a linear function of ideological 
dissimilarity between government and voter ideology. Formally: 
 
          (1) 
 
Inci is the party in government placement on left/right scale reported by individual i and 
Vi is the self-placement in the same scale. The coefficient β1 represents the distortion effect 
caused by ideology. As shown in expression 2, we obtain the unbiased government 
performance by deducting the distortion that we have found from the original performance 
variable: 
 
          (2) 
 
As unlocated voters have no reason to bias government performance we impute them 
the value 0 in the ideological distance variable so that β1 effect is annulled. An implication of 
our assumption is that those with the same ideology as the government evaluate incumbent 
performance with no bias. It may be though that it would be more realistic to place the 
unbiased voter in another position, but (leaving aside the difficulty to find a plausible 
Performance= β0 + β1×(|Inci-Vi|)
Unbiased Performance= Performance - β1×(|Inci-Vi|)
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placement) the alternatives make the expression much more complicated. And, in any case, 
the essential assumption holds: bias is produced by party and voter ideological dissonance. 
 
Party ID. Here consider that the unbiased government performance value is the one that 
results from doing the counterfactual that voter has no party identification. We first estimate 
the model (3) where performance is the dependent variable and party identification is the 
independent variable, with having no party identification as base category. 
 
         (3) 
 
B1 and B2 represent the bias caused by government and opposition party identification 
respectively. As before, we deduct these coefficients from the original incumbent 
performance variable (see expression 4) .People with no party identification are assumed to 
have no bias and, hence, we keep the original values. 
 
              (4) 
 
 
 
Performance= β0 + β1×IDinc + β2×IDoppo
Unbiased Performance= Performance - β1×IDinc -β2×IDoppo
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DATA AND VARIABLE-BUILDING APPENDIX 
 
Surveys used in this paper 
 
In table 1. Data from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). 
 
In figure 1 and tables 2-3. Post-electoral surveys of Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas (CIS) for 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2004 (catalogue survey 
numbers 1327, 1542, 1842, 2061, 2210, 2384 and 2559 -respectively) and the post-electoral 
survey of DATA for 1979. 
 
In tables 4-8 and figures 2 and 3. Pre-electoral CIS surveys for 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 
1996, 2000 and 2004 (catalogue survey numbers 1325, 1526, 1838, 2059, 2207, 2382 and 
2555 -respectively) and for 1979 we use DATA survey. 
 
In table 9. Spanish national sample for 1993 of the Cross-national election study project 
(CNEP) and Post-electoral data of Demoscopia 2004. 
 
Variable construction 
 
Non-ideological voter (unlocated). For all surveys we dichotomized self-placement in 
1-10 ideological scale where the answers “don’t know” and “don’t answer” become value 1 
and the remaining values are coded as value 0. The original question in the survey is 
formulated as following: “When we talk about politics we usually use the terms left and right. 
In this card [where it shows a ten point scale] there are different boxes that go form left to 
right. In which box would you place yourself?” 
 
Political Information. Index of main party leader knowledge where 1 means that no 
leader was recognised and maximum value means knowledge of all leaders. The highest 
value changes across surveys: 10 in 1986, 9 in 1982 and 1989, 8 in 2000 and 2004, 7 in 1979, 
6 in 1993 and 4 in 1996. The original question in the survey is formulated as following: 
“Now I will quote some names of different political leaders. I would like you to tell me if you 
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know them and to score their work. Score them from 0 to 10, regarding that 0 means very bad 
and 10 means very good”. 
 
Performance. Variable based on voter’s evaluations of the national economic 
performance measured on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad). The orginal question in 
the survey is formulated as following: “Focusing on the current general economic situation of 
Spain, would you describe it as very good, good, regular, bad or very bad?” 
 
Sex. Dichotomous variable where female is coded as 1 and male is coded as 0. 
 
Age. Continuous variable where the minimum value is 18 years old. 
 
Education. Continuous variable where that ranges from 1 to 6 (where 1 means no 
studies, 2 means primary school, 3 means high school, 4 means occupational training, 5 
means university studies (3years degree) and 6 means university studies (5 years degree). The 
original question in the survey is formulated as following: “Which are the official studies of 
higher level that you have?” 
 
Leadership. Variable (from 0 to 10) that evaluates the political performance of the 
leader of the party in government, which in Spain have been always the president of the 
government as well. For constructing this variable we used the same survey question as for 
Political Information. 
 
Party identification. Dichotomous variable where 1 means that the voter is identified 
with the party and 0 that she is not. For 1986 we use the survey question: “I will give you 
some political parties. I would like you to tell me if you feel very close, close, indifferent, far 
or very far from each party”. We code as being identified of the party if the voter feels close 
or very close to the party. For 2000, the survey item is as follows: Would you mind telling me 
if you think close to some party and whom? Those recognising themselves as close to the 
party in office or to the main oppositional party are coded as 1 in “pro-government partisans” 
and “anti-government partisans” respectively. 
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Incumbent. Variable takes on value 1 whenever the interviewed cast a ballot for the 
current party in office. Otherwise, 0 (we considered as missing cases those not turning out). 
As there have not been formal coalitional governments in Spain, we have not had trouble 
with the definition of who holds the incumbency. 
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